WASHINGTON — Four months after promising a bold new strategy on Iraq, the Bush administration is instead watching its first foreign-policy initiative fall into disarray.
At the United Nations, a last-minute scramble by the United States and Britain to win passage of a resolution opening the way for the two-pronged strategy appears deadlocked. The resolution would provide the legal framework for easing the worlds toughest economic sanctions — and the suffering of the Iraqi people — while tightening the arms embargo on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
The current sanctions policy, which allows Iraq to use oil revenue to buy humanitarian goods under U.N. supervision, expires Tuesday. It is now likely to be renewed for another month or two while the debate rages on.
But even if the resolution does win passage, key Mideast governments once receptive to a revised policy are now either wary of the U.S. formula or no longer keen to help make it work. Some who have been trading for cheap oil in violation of the sanctions cant afford to end such operations. Compliance would cost economically strapped Jordan, for example, at least $1 billion a year, Arab envoys said.
As a result, cutting off the worlds largest and most lucrative oil-smuggling operation via four neighboring states looks increasingly difficult. Smuggling provides Hussein with billions in illegal income annually, his only significant source of independent funds not channeled through the United Nations.
Without major incentives, Jordan, Syria, Iran and Turkey are unlikely to agree, concludes a new report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.
The bottom line is that the new strategy, which would allow trade of many civilian goods, might alleviate suffering among the Iraqi people, the issue that led Washington to succumb to international pressure and propose an overhaul of a decade-old policy. But the new policy would be as vulnerable to failure as the previous strategy in keeping a disparate array of countries on board, according to Mideast officials, European diplomats, U.S. analysts and former U.N. weapons inspectors.
Part of the problem is that much of the world is almost as weary as Iraq is of the punitive approach, which affects foreign investors, Baghdads creditors and energy markets as well as Iraqs 22 million people.
The new policy will be highly vulnerable to several factors, many beyond U.S. control. They include new factors like backlash from the Arab streets for U.S. support of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, said Judith Yaphe, a former intelligence analyst now at National Defense University in Washington. They include ingrained practices that will make it almost impossible to cut off all Iraqs oil smuggling.
But they also include a world that simply doesnt care as much as we do and is anxious to do business with Baghdad again. Its going to be very hard to get cooperation from enough of the players to make a new policy work.
The new strategy is most vulnerable on the issue of eliminating Iraqs deadliest weapons. Since 1991, the pre-eminent U.N. goal has been to ensure that Iraq does not again threaten stability in the oil-rich region.
The mandate of the new inspection regime, approved by the U.N. Security Council in December 1999, has changed in subtle ways that may make it virtually impossible to ensure that all of Iraqs nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles are destroyed, U.S. analysts and former inspectors warned.
The original inspectors — who tracked down thousands of tons of weapons between 1991 and 1998 — were charged with certifying that all the deadliest arms were found and eliminated. And they had U.N. carte blanche to do it, backed by the threat of military retaliation if Iraq didnt comply.
Their mission was aborted, however, when they were withdrawn before the U.S.-led Operation Desert Fox airstrikes in 1998. The strikes were launched in response to Husseins obstruction of weapons inspectors, and Iraq never let them return.
The new team, in contrast, must only certify that it is unable to find anything more. The inspectors are unlikely to comb the countryside or reconstruct what Baghdad acquired to determine everything it produced — meticulous detective work that depends as much on documents as war material, former inspectors and U.S. analysts said.
Under the previous rules of engagement, Iraq had to prove its innocence — by revealing all it had built or acquired and then completely destroying all arms and production facilities. Under the new system, the weapons inspectors have to prove that Iraq is still guilty. If they are unable to find anything in the places they look, then Baghdad may be given a clean bill of health.
But former U.N. inspectors and U.S. intelligence officials are convinced that Hussein concealed a strategic reserve — probably a small number of missiles with biological or chemical agents, plus an active research-and-development program in all weapons — that was never found. And Baghdad has had three years to better hide the materiel.
If new inspectors go in under the ambiguous terms of U.N. Resolution 1284, then they run the risk of having inspections that will fail — that will be easily manipulated by the regime and that will end up giving Iraq a clean slate simply because inspectors cant find anything else, Yaphe said.
The United States will have little recourse and less input this time around. The new team, which reconfigured its membership to counter complaints of U.S. domination, contains Americas role by giving top jobs to inspectors from France, Russia and China. Those nations have been the most active in promoting an end to sanctions, former inspectors said.
The inspections are designed to be kinder, gentler and more transparent — to Iraq, said Charles Duelfer, a former assistant U.N. secretary-general and the longest-serving former U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq.
The bottom line is that getting a weapons team into Iraq may actually prove more of a danger under new rules that dont encourage the grinding, years-long process of unraveling weapons production from beginning to end.
Within the constraints that the international community is now working, it will basically be impossible to disarm Saddam — short of occupying the country, which isnt viable either, Duelfer said.
The second problem for the new U.S. strategy is the plan to end Iraqs oil smuggling. For the policy to work, all parties must agree not to smuggle, and to cede tens of millions of dollars they make from Iraqi oil price discounts of as much as 50 percent. As soon as one country deviates, others are likely to follow, oil analysts predicted.
U.S. policy is susceptible to a mixture of Husseins needs and conniving and the realities of corruption, bribery and smuggling that are widespread in the region, said Henri Barkey, a former State Department policy planning staffer. Some party is certain to crack.
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